税收分成下的企业集团异地发展

《财经研究》 2022年48卷第6期 页码：140 - 154  online：2022年6月6日

税收分成下的企业集团异地发展

Enterprise Nonlocal Development under Tax Sharing

作者（中）：张孝蔚1, 张婷婷2, 曹春方3 *

作者（英）：Zhang Xiaowei1, Zhang Tingting2, Cao Chunfang3 *

作者单位：1.茅台学院 工商管理系，贵州 仁怀 564507 2.西南财经大学 保险学院，四川 成都 611130 3.中山大学 管理学院，广东 广州 510275

摘要：文章探讨了我国省与市县政府间的税收分成限制还是促进了集团异地发展。税收分成影响下的税收竞争可能以税负和税基实现，若政府更倾向于增加企业税负，则集团异地发展更多；若政府更倾向于争取税基，则会限制税基外流，集团异地发展更少。文章以手工收集的市县政府企业所得税占比来衡量税收分成，以上市公司异地子公司比例来衡量集团异地发展情况，检验了税收分成对集团异地发展的两种影响哪一种占优。研究发现，税收分成比例越高，集团异地发展越少，这证实了税收分成下的税基竞争，而非税负竞争。但在途径上，地方政府以选择性征管来留住税基，对异地发展的集团进行了惩罚式征税。税收分成增加了异地发展较多的集团税收，而没有增加异地发展较少的集团税收。区分母子公司税收发现，这种选择性征管主要体现在母公司税收上，而在子公司税收上则没有体现。文章从税收分成视角拓展了税收影响集团异地发展的相关研究，还从选择性税收征管路径拓展了“拉弗曲线”差异化应用，研究结论为我国税负公平的税收制度优化和供给侧改革的减税降费政策执行提供了参考。

关键词：税收分成; 税基竞争; 选择性征管; 集团异地发展

Summary: Two things are inevitable in one’s life, death and tax. The impact of taxation on individual behavior and the allocation of corporate resources is undoubted, such as affecting the transfer of multinational players, the flow of multinational talents, and the flow of various multinational capitals, etc. Existing studies mainly focus on the impact of differences in statutory tax rates. However, for Chinese companies, the specific policies of statutory tax rates are more controlled by the central government, while the actual tax enforcement is done by the local government. The tax enforcement may be the more important factor in China.This paper discusses how the tax sharing between provincial and municipal governments in China affects enterprise development in nonlocal places. Tax competition under the impact of tax sharing may be realized by tax rate and tax base. If the local government strives for more tax base under tax sharing, the outflow of tax base will be limited, and the group will stay in local places and develop less in nonlocal places. On the contrary, if the local government puts more tax burden on companies, the group will develop more in nonlocal places. We use the enterprise income tax sharing of municipal and county governments to measure the tax sharing and nonlocal subsidiaries to measure the development of corporate groups in nonlocal places to test which effect above is dominant. We find that: (1) Higher tax sharing is related to less nonlocal subsidiaries, which suggests that it is tax base competition under tax sharing not tax rate competition. (2) Tax sharing increases tax in companies with more nonlocal subsidiaries but does not increase tax in companies with less nonlocal subsidiaries, which indicates that under the tax base competition, the local government retains the tax base by selective taxation, and imposes punitive taxation on companies which develop more in nonlocal places. (3) This selective taxation is mainly reflected in the parent company with geographical restrictions, but not reflected in its subsidiaries.The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) In addition to the tax rate, it explores the impact of tax enforcement on enterprise development in nonlocal places, and expands the relevant literature on enterprise development in nonlocal places from the perspective of tax sharing. (2) It expands the differentiated application of the “Laffer Curve” with Chinese characteristics through the path of selective taxation to retain the tax base. This paper finds that under the taxation system with Chinese characteristics, the grassroots government uses selective taxation to increase the actual tax rate as a punitive tool, and the actual tax rate rises while the tax base increases simultaneously. This conclusion is contrary to the “Laffer Curve”. (3) It expands and enriches the studies in the field of fiscal and tax decentralization. Existing literature mainly focuses on the impact of tax sharing on tax rates. This paper provides evidence from the tax base and explores the path effect of selective taxation with Chinese characteristics. The conclusions provide reference for the optimization of tax system with fair tax burden and the implementation of tax reduction and fee policy in supply-side reform.

Key words: tax sharing; tax base competition; selective taxation; enterprise nonlocal development

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20210718.101

收稿日期：2020-6-12

基金项目：国家自然科学基金面上项目（71672151，72072189）；国家自然科学基金青年项目（71902163）；教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目（2019040027）；广东省基础与应用基础研究基金（2021B1515020052，2020A1515011212）；中山大学高校基本科研业务费青年教师重点培育项目（20wkzd02）

全文：点击下方“阅读原文”查看全文