平台经济下的安全监管：以顺风车市场整改为例

《财经研究》 2022年48卷第5期 页码：155 - 168  online：2022年5月9日

平台经济下的安全监管：以顺风车市场整改为例

Safety Supervision under the Platform Economy: Taking the Ride-hailing Market as an Example

作者（中）：邹干1, 刘其宏2, 王小芳3

作者（英）：Zou Gan1, Liu Qihong2, Wang Xiaofang3

作者单位：1.上海财经大学 商学院, 上海 200433 2.俄克拉荷马大学 经济系, 美国 诺曼 73019 3.上海理工大学 管理学院, 上海 200093

摘要：随着平台经济的发展，匹配质量日渐成为社会关注的重要问题。文章基于平台经济下对产品（服务）安全监管的考虑，以顺风车平台整改政策为例，分析了“司机准入门槛”和“平台安全建设”两种管制手段的有效性。首先分别基于平台利润最大化及社会总福利最大化，探讨了平台自治和政府管制下的行动激励差异。随后分析了成本系数和司机敏感系数变化对均衡选择的影响。最后基于对平台和政府管制激励的研究结论，结合现实情况，探讨了由政府制定司机准入标准、由政府制定平台安全建设标准以及政府和平台共同制定安全建设标准这三种监管政策的实际效果。研究结果表明，在安全建设方面，平台自身努力远低于社会最优下的要求；在司机准入方面，平台设定的准入要求在不同情境下存在过于宽松或者过于严格的问题。当政府和平台共同监管时，在大多数情况下，政府应利用平台对司机准入筛选相对严格的优势，令平台自行设定准入门槛，进而再通过与平台共同制定安全建设标准，以弥补平台安全建设激励不足的劣势，在保证出行安全的同时保护平台匹配效率不受损害。文章讨论了三种可行监管手段的有效性，为监管部门提供了参考。

关键词：顺风车服务; 网络外部性; 平台经济; 政府监管

Summary: Taking the rectification policy of the ride-hailing platform as an example, this paper analyzes the effectiveness of two control methods — “driver access threshold” and “platform safety construction”. First, based on the maximization of platform profits and total social welfare, the differences in action incentives under platform autonomy and government regulation are explored. Second, the impact of cost coefficient and driver sensitivity coefficient change on equilibrium is analyzed. Third, the practical effect of three regulatory policies, namely, “government sets the driver access standard” “government sets the platform safety construction standard” and “government and platform jointly set the safety construction standard”, is discussed.The research results show that in terms of safety construction, the platform’s own efforts are far below the requirements of social optimality. In terms of driver access, incomplete surplus extraction effect, endogenous negative externality effect and internalized driver cost effect comprehensively determine the gap of choice between platform and government. Under the joint supervision, when the driver access threshold has a certain negative impact on “good drivers”, the government should take the advantage of relatively strict driver access screening set by the platform itself and strive to make up for the platform’s lack of incentives for safety construction. At this time, “government and platform jointly set the safety construction standard” and “government sets the platform safety construction standard” are the optimal regulatory choice. When the driver’s access threshold does not have a negative impact on “good drivers” and access screening has a certain cost efficiency, the government should take the advantage of the platform’s relatively strong incentives for self-safety construction and make up for the insufficient platform screening. At this time, “government sets the driver access standard” is the best choice. When access screening is no longer cost-effective, “government and platform jointly set the safety construction standard” and “government sets the platform safety construction standard” remain the optimal regulatory choice.This paper tries to make contributions in the following aspects: First, the existing literature mostly considers that the control of merchant product quality is mostly based on the product evaluation system. This paper further introduces the regulatory method of access screening, and the research results have stronger practical significance. Second, from the perspectives of platform and social optimality, this paper discusses the similarities and differences of using the two governance methods and explores the differences between platforms and government supervision. Third, from the perspective of joint supervision, this paper considers the differences in the effect of the three regulatory policies in different scenarios, and the research conclusions have strong practical significance.

Key words: ride-hailing; network externality; platform economy; government supervision

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20220113.304

收稿日期：2021-8-15

基金项目：国家自然科学基金（71172139）

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