关系型合约视角下双重股权结构选择动因解析——来自中概股的经验证据

《财经研究》 2022年48卷第3期 页码：139 - 153  online：2022年3月2日

关系型合约视角下双重股权结构选择动因解析——来自中概股的经验证据

Motivation of Dual-class Share Structure Selection from the Perspective of Relational Contracts: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Concept Shares

作者（中）：蓝紫文, 李增泉

作者（英）：Lan Ziwen, Li Zengquan

作者单位：1.上海财经大学 会计学院，上海 200433

摘要：文章从关系型合约的视角研究了公司选择双重股权结构的内在动因。在我国，企业的商业模式普遍具有关系型交易特征。与市场型交易不同，关系型交易依靠交易各方由关系专有性投资所建立起的信任关系来自我履约。文章分析认为，双重股权结构带来的多倍投票权与稳定控制权可以降低关系型合约的执行成本，保障关系型合约的长期稳定执行。文章以1997—2018年339家在美上市的中国公司IPO年度数据为样本，发现公司具有越多的关系型合约，越可能采用双重股权结构。进一步分析表明，当公司所在地的市场化程度、人口流动率较低，或者社会资本紧密度较高时，这种正相关关系更加显著。此外，在采用双重股权结构后，关系型合约公司会通过建立更加完善的公司治理机制来缓解双重股权结构所带来的代理问题。例如，公司会更大概率聘请国际“四大”会计师事务所进行审计，开展更多的投资者电话会议活动，设定更高的独立董事比例，提高会计信息披露质量以吸引更多的分析师关注。上述结果表明，在关系型社会中，双重股权结构对保障公司关系型合约的执行具有独特优势。文章结论对于监管部门、上市公司和投资者更好地理解我国制度背景下的双重股权结构具有实践意义。

关键词：双重股权结构; 关系型合约; 专有性投资; 公司治理

Summary: In China, the business model of firms generally has the characteristic of relationship transaction. The unique political and cultural factors shape the “Chinese governance” model which is very different from western firms. That is, the transaction between firms and various stakeholders is not entirely based on the market price, but on the trust relationship formed by long-term exchanges. So, relational contracts have strong personality characteristics and are often embedded in a continuous relationship. Based on this unique institutional background in China, this paper believes that the dual-class share structure has unique advantages for the maintenance of relationship contracts. The biggest feature of the dual-class share structure is that the controller of firms has continuous and stable trading power at the beginning of stock issuance. Therefore, both insiders and external stakeholders have more stable expectations for the development of firms, which can not only provide a favorable basis for the maintenance of relational contracts, but also provide a guarantee for the long-term and stable implementation of relational contracts.This paper takes 339 Chinese concept shares from 1997 to 2018 as the sample. The empirical results show that the firm’s choice of dual-class share structure has a significant positive correlation with whether the founder is the ultimate controlling shareholder, whether the executive is local, the firm’s political relationship and the firm’s customer concentration. Furthermore, this paper also finds that this positive correlation is strengthened when the marketization degree of the firm’s region is lower, the population mobility rate is lower, or the social capital tightness is higher. In addition, this paper also finds that after adopting the dual-class share structure, the relational contract firm will reduce the agency cost by establishing a more perfect corporate governance mechanism.Based on the institutional background of “relational society” in China, this paper provides empirical evidence of the governance of relational contracts with special ownership structure, and expands the research perspective of corporate governance. In additional, this paper enriches the literature on how corporate contract structure affects the governance mechanism. Based on the firm level, this paper analyzes the reasons why firms adopt the dual-class share structure from the perspective of relational contracts, which is a direction not involved in the existing literature. Finally, this paper also has some practical significance. That is, it can help regulators, investors and other market parties better understand the dual-class share structure under the background of China.

Key words: dual-class share structure; relational contracts; specific investment; corporate governance

DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.jfe.20211226.101

收稿日期：2020-11-4

基金项目：国家自然科学基金面上项目（71972124，72172078）

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