[1] Acemoglu D. (1997), Training and Innovation in an Imperfect LabourMarket, in “Review of Economic Studies”, 64, pp.445-464.

[2] Acemoglu D. e Pischke J. (1996), Why do firms train? Theory andevidence, NBER Working Paper n.5605.

[3] Acemoglu D. e Pischke J. (1998a), The Structure of Wages andInvestment in General Training, NBER Working Paper n.6357.

[4] Acemoglu D. e Pischke J. (1998b), Why do firms train? Theory andevidence, in “Quarterly Journal of Economics”, 113, pp.79-119.

[5] Acemoglu D. e Pischke J. (1999a), Beyond Becker: Training inimperfect labour markets, in “Economic Journal”, 109, pp. F112-F142.

[6] Acemoglu D. e Pischke J. (1999b), The Structure of Wages andInvestment in General Training, in “Journal of Political Economy”, 107, pp.539-572.

[7] Acemoglu D. e Pischke J. (1999c), Minimum Wages and On-the-jobTraining, NBER Working Paper n.7184.

[8] Acemoglu D. e Pischke J. (2000), Certification of training andtraining outcomes, in “European Economic Review”, 44, pp.917-927.

[9] Addison J.T., Barrett C.R. e SiebertW.S. (1997), The Economics of Labour Market Regulation, in

Addison e Siebert (eds), LabourMarkets in Europe, The Dryden Press, London.

[10] Ariga K., Brunello G. e Ohkusa Y. (2000), Demand and supply ofskills in a corporate hierarcy, in

Ariga K., Brunello G. e Ohkusa Y. (eds.), Internal labour markets inJapan, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P..

[11] Arulampalam W. e Booth A.L. (1998), Training and Labour MarketFlexibility: Is There a Trade-

Off?, in “British Journal of Industrial Relations”, 36, 4,pp.521-536.

[12] Autor D.H. (2001), Why Do Temporary Help Firms Provide FreeGeneral Skills Training?, mimeo, MIT.

[13] Autor D.H., Levy F. e Murnane R.J. (1999), Skills Training in theTemporary Help Sector: Employer Motivations and Worker Impacts, mimeo, MITe Harvard University.

[14] Barron J.M., Berger M.C. e Black D.A. (1997), On-the-Job Training,Upjohn Institute for

Employment Research, Kalamazoo.

[15] Bartel A.P. e Sicherman N. (1998), Technological Change and theSkill Acquisition of Young

Workers, in “Journal of Labor Economics”, 16, 1998, pp.718-755.

[16] Becker G.S. (1962), Investment in Human Capital: a TheoreticalAnalysis, in “Journal of Political

Economy”, 70, 5, pp. 9-49.

[17] Bishop J.H. (1994), The Impact of Previous Training onProductivity and Wages, in L.M. Lynch

(ed.), Training in the private sector, The University of ChicagoPress, Chicagoe London.15

[18] Black S.E. e Lynch L.M. (1996), Human Capital Investments andProductivity, in “American Economic Review”, 86, pp.263-267.

[19] Boal W.M. e Ransom M.R. (1997), Monopsony in the Labor Market,in “Journal of Economic

Literature”, 35, pp.86-112.

[20] Booth A.L. e Zoega G. (2000), Why Do Firms Invest in GeneralTraining? ‘Good’ Firms and ‘Bad’Firms as a Source of Monopsony Power, inCEPR Discussion Papers, 2536.

[21] Booth A.L. e Zoega G. (2001), Is Wage Compression a NecessaryCondition for Firm-Financed

General Training?, in CEPR Discussion Papers,2845.

[22] Boyer G.R. e Smith R.S. (2001), The development of the neoclassicaltradition in labor economics, in “Industrial and Labor Relations Review”,54, 2, pp.199-223.

[23] Brunello G. e Ishikawa T. (1999), Education, training and labourmarket structure:ItalyandJapanin comparative perspective, in “Economic Systems”, 23, 1, pp.61-83.

[24] Brunello G. e Medio A. (2001), An explanation of internationaldifferences in education and

workplace training, in “European Economic Review”,45, pp.307-322.

[25] Chang C. e Wang Y. (1996), Human capital Investment underAsymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited, in “Journal ofLabor Economics”, 14, 3, pp.505-519.

[26] Chapman P. (1993), The Economics of Training,Harvester-Wheatsheaf, London.

[27] Chapman P. (1994), Investing in skills: training policy in theUK, in T.Buxton, P. Chapman e P.

Temple, Britain’sEconomic Performance, Routledge, London-New.

[28] Coe D.T. e Snower D.J. (1997), Policy Complementarities: The Casefor Fundamental Labor Market Reform, in “IMF Staff Papers”, 44, 1, pp.1-35.

[29] Crouch C., Finegold D. e Sa ko M. (1999), Are Skills the Answer? ,Oxford University Press, Oxford.

[30] Culpepper P.D. (1999), The future of the high-skill equilibrium inGermany,in “Oxford Review of

Economic Policy”, 15, 1, pp.43-59.

[31] Finegold D. e Soskice D. (1988), The failure of training inBritain:analysis and prescription, in

“Oxford Review of Economic Policy”, 4, 3, pp.21-53.

[32] Frey L. e Croce G. (2001), Labour flexibility, training and labourdemand strategies about young

workers in Italy, XIII Annual Meeting-SASE, Amsterdam.

[33] Gersbach H. e Schmutzler A. (2001), A Product Theory of Trainingand Turnover in Firms, IZA

discussion paper, 327.

[34] Greenhalgh C. (1999), Adult Vocational Training and GovernmentPolicy inFranceandBritain,in

“Oxford Reviewe of Economic Policy”, 15, 1, pp.97-113.

[35] Hashimoto M. (1981), Firm-Specific Human Capital as a SharedInvestment, in “American Economic Review”, 71, 3, pp.475-482.

[36] Hashimoto M. e Yu B.T. (1980), Specific capital, employmentcontracts, and wage rigidity , in “Bell Journal of Economics”, 11, 2,pp.536-549.

[37] Katz E. e Ziderman A. (1990), Investment in general training: therole of information and labour

mobility, in “Economic Journal”, 100, pp.1147-1158.

[38] Lazear E.P. (1993), The New Economics of Personnel, in “Labour”,7, pp.3-23.

[39] Loewenstein M.A. e Spletzer J.R. (1998), Dividing the Costs andReturns to General Training, in

“Journal of Labor Economics”, 16, 1, pp.142-171.

[40] Lynch L.M. (1993), The Economics of Youth Training in theUnited States,in “Economic Journal”,

103, pp.1292-1302.

[41] Lynch L.M. (1994), Introduction, in L.M. Lynch (ed.), Trainingin the private sector, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago e London.

[42] Milgrom P. e Roberts J. (1992), Economics, Organization andManagement, Prentice Hall,

Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

[43] Mincer J. (1958), Investment in human capital and personal incomedistribution, in “Journal of

Political Economy”, 66, 4, pp.281-302.

[44] Neumark D. e Wascher W. (2001), Minimum Wages and TrainingRevisited, in “Journal of Labor

Economics”, 19,3, pp.563-595.

[45] OECD (1999), Employment Outlook, Paris.

[46] Ohashi I.e Tachibanaki T. (1998), Introduction, in Ohashi e Tachibanaki (eds), InternalLabour

Markets, Incentives and Employment, Macmillan, London.

[47] Peraita C. (2001a), Firm sponsored training in regulated labormarkets: evidence fromSpain,

working paper n.15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas.

[48] Peraita C. (2001b), Testing the Acemoglu -Pischke model inSpain, in “EconomicLetters”, 72,

pp.107-115.

[49] Schultz T.W. (1961), Investment in human capital, in “AmericanEconomic Review”, 51, pp.1-17.

Siebert W.S. e Addison J.T. (1994), InternalLabour Market: Causes and Consequences, in “Oxford

Review of Economic Policy”, 7, 1, pp.76-92.

[50] Snower D.J. (1996), The low-skill, bad-job trap, in A.L. Boothe D.J. Snower (eds), Acquiring Skills.Market failures, their symptoms andpolicy responses, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press.

[51] Soskice D. (1994), Reconciling Markets and Institutions: TheGerman Apprenticeship System, in

L.M. Lynch (ed.), Training in the private sector, The University ofChicago Press, Chicagoe London.

[52] Steedman H. (1993), The Economics of Youth Training inGermany, in“Economic Journal”, 103,

pp.1279-1291.

[53] Stevens M. (1994), A Theoretical Model of On-The-Job Training withImperfect Competition, in

“Oxford Economic Papers”, 46, pp.537-562.

[54] Stevens M. (1996), Transferable training and poaching externality,in A.L. Booth e D.J. Snower

(eds), Acquiring Skills. Market failures, their symptoms and policyresponses, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press.

[55] StevensM. (1999), Human capital theory andUKvocational training policy,in “Oxford Review of Economic Policy”, 15, 1, pp.97-113.

[56] Stevens M. (2001), Should Firms Be Required to Pay for VocationalTraining?, in “Economic

Journal”, 111, 473, pp.485-505.

[57] Wakita S. (1998), A Model for Patterns of Industrial Relations,in Ohashi I.e Tachibanaki T. (eds),

Internal Labour Markets, Incentives and Employment, Macmillan, London.

[58] Biglaiser, G., Mezzetti, C., 1993. Principalscompeting for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard.Journal of Economic Theory 61, 302–330.

[59] Blomstrom, M., Kokko, A., 1998. Multinationalcorporations and spillovers. Journal of Economic

Surveys 12, 247–277.

[60] Booth,A.L., Chatterji, M., 1995. Training and contracts. WorkingPaper 95-15,Research Centre on Micro-Social Change, University of Essex.

[61] Booth,A.L., Chatterji, M., 1998. Unions and effcient training. EconomicJournal 108, 328–343.

[62] Burdett,K., Smith, E., 1996. Education and matching externalities. In: Booth, A.L.,Snower, D.J. (Eds.), Acquiring Skills. Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, MA, pp. 65–80.

[63] Cantor,R., 1990. Firm specific training and contract length. Economica 57, 1–14.

[64] Dolton, P.J., 1993. The economics of youth training inBritain. Economic Journal 103, 1261–1278.

[65] Elbaum,B., 1989. Why apprenticeship persisted inBritainbut not in theUnited States.Journal of Economic History 49, 337–349.

[66] Finegold,D., Soskice, D., 1988. The failure of British training: Analysis andprescription. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 4, 21–53.

[67] Greenwald,B.C., 1986. Adverse selection in the labour market. Review of EconomicStudies 53, 325–347.

[68] Hamilton,G., 1995. Enforcement in apprenticeship contracts: Were runaways a seriousproblem? Evidence from Montreal.Journal of Economic History 55, 551–574.

[69] Hamilton,G., 1996. The market for Montrealapprentices: Contract length and information. Explorations in EconomicHistory 33, 496–523.

[70] Harhoff,D., Kane, T.J., 1995. Financing apprenticeship training: Evidence fromGermany. In:Stacey, N. (Ed.), School-to-Work: What Does Research Say About It? offce ofEducational Research and Improvement (ED), Washington, DC.

[71] Hermalin,B., 1990. Adverse selection, short-term contracting, and the underprovisionof on-the-job training. WorkingPaper No. 90–139. Department of Economics, University of California,Berkeley.

[72] Kahn,C., Huberman, G., 1988. Two-sided uncertainty and “up-or-out” contracts. Journal of Labor Economics 6, 423–444.

[73] Laffont,J.-J., Tirole, J., 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement andRegulation. MIT Press, Cambridge,MA.

[74] Lees,D., Chiplin, B., 1970. The economics of industrial training. Lloyds BankReview 96, 29–41.

Lee, D.,Marsden, D., Rickman, P., Duncombe, J., 1990. Schemingfor Youth: A Study of YTSin the

Enterprise Culture.Open University Press, Buckingham.

[75] Loewenstein,M.A., Spletzer, J.R., 1998. Dividing the costs and returns to general training.Journal of Labor Economics 16, 142–171.

[76] Lynch,L.M., 1992. Private-sector training and the earnings of young workers.American Economic Review 82, 299–312.

[77] Malcomson,J.M., Maw, J., McCormick, B., 2002. General Training by Firms,Apprenticeship Contracts, and Public Policy. CESifo Working Paper No. 696.

[78] Prendergast,C., 1993. The role of promotion in inducing specific human capital acquisition.Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 523–534.

[79] Schlicht,E., 1996. Endogenous on-the-job training with moral hazard. LabourEconomics 3, 81–92.

[80] Soskice,D., 1994. Reconciling markets and institutions: The German apprenticeshipsystem. In: Lynch, L.M.(Ed.), Training and the Private Sector:International Comparisons. University of Chicago Press,Chicago,pp. 25–60.

[81] Stevens,M., 1994a. Labour contracts and efficiency in on-the-job training.Economic Journal 104, 408–419.

[82] Stevens, M., 1994b. Aninvestment model for the supply of training by employers. Economic Journal104,556–570.

[83] Waldman,M., 1990. “Up-or-out” contracts: A signaling perspective. Journal of Labor Economics 8, 230–250.

[84] Williamson,O.E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. The Free Press, New York.

[85] Katz, E., Ziderman,A., 1990. Investment in general training: The role of information and labour

mobility.Economic Journal 100, 1147-1158.

[86] Woodbury,S. A. (1983). Substitution between wage and nonwage benefits. AmericanEconomic Review, 73(1), 166–182.

[87] Hashimoto,M. (1981). Firm-specific human capital as a shared investment. American Economic Review, 71(3), 475–482.

[88] Green, F.(2000). The impact of company human resource policies on social skills:Implications for training sponsorship, quit rates and efficiency wages. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 47(3), 251–272.

[89] Fanchon,P., & Melese, F. (1996). A model of periodic job training. International Advances in Economic Research, 2(4), 457–470.

[90] Barron,Jack M., Dan A. Black, and Mark A. Lowenstein. “Job Matching and On-the-JobTraining.” Journalof Labor Economics (January 1989):1–19.

[91] Carmichael,Lorne. “Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders.” Bell Journal of Economics (Spring 1982): 251–58.

[92]  张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].第一版.上海:上海人民出版社,1996.

[93]张钢,从人力资本到组织资本：一个对“经济人”假设的拓展分析[J],自然辩证法通讯，2000（2）42-50

[94] 雅各布·明塞尔,人力资本研究[M],北京：中国经济出版社,2001

[95] 方竹兰,人力资本理论在中国的进一步发展[J],中国人民大学学报, 2001(6), 51-57

[96] 爱德华·拉齐尔,人事管理经济学[M],北京,北京大学出版社,2000

[97] 朱方伟,武春友,基于员工忠诚度的在职培训投资决策研究[J],大连理工大学学报（社会科学版），2003(1), 38-41

[98] 王金营,企业人力资本投资风险探析P[J],河北大学学报(-哲学社会科学版)，2002（2），99-102

[99] 孔令峰,论人力资本投资的风险[J],当代经济科学,2002(3),24-28

[100] 周亚新，国有企业人力资本投资弱化的原因及其对策[J]，企业经济，2003(7),15-18

[101] 陈捷，政府在人力资本投资中的多重角色[J]，江西行政学院学报，2003(3),45-46

[102] 徐仁璋，人力资本投资的风险与对策[J]，中南财经大学学报，2001（2），48-51